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Abstract 
The establishment of fact forms the cornerstone of any forensic discipline, with digital 
analysis being no exception. Practitioners are under an obligation as expert witnesses to 
provide factual accounts of digital scenarios, which must be underpinned by robust 
knowledge and evidential findings. To achieve this level of reliability, investigatory research 
must be suitably planned, implemented and analysed in a way which instills confidence in 
the accuracy of any findings. This is particularly important as digital forensic organisations 
are now facing the impending requirement to have acquired ISO/IEC 17025 accreditation.  
This article proposes the Framework for Reliable Experimental Design (FRED) to support 
those engaged in the field of digital forensics research to contribute reliable, robust findings. 
FRED focuses on the underpinning procedures involved within undertaking the reverse 
engineering of digital data structures and the process of extracting and interpreting digital 
content in a reliable way. The proposed framework is designed to be a resource for those 
operating within the digital forensic field, both in industry and academia, to support and 
develop research best practice within the discipline.   
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1 Introduction 
As a field, digital forensics (DF) remains in a constant state of change, driven by 
technological changes. In an effort to prevent the construction of another definition of DF, 
focus is drawn to Raghavan’s (2013) following characterisation. ‘Digital forensics is a branch 
of science that involves the application of scientific principles to the investigation of artifacts 
present in one or more digital devices in order to understand and reconstruct the sequence 
of events that must have transpired in generating the said artifacts’ (Raghavan, 2013, p.91). 
The key components to highlight within this definition lie with the need to ‘understand’ and 
‘reconstruct’ digital data, a requirement for practitioners in all investigation scenarios. To 
carry out these tasks requires the use of effective research strategies, underpinned by the 
implementation of a robust research methodologies in order to aid the accurate interpretation 
and understanding of digital data. Yet currently, there is limited guidance available to 
practitioners and academics supporting the construction of valid DF research at this level.  
 
Atkinson (2014, p.248) suggests that a DF practitioner ‘is unlikely to, and possibly incapable 
of, fully understanding the ever-changing nuances of the contiguous technological layers 
their expertise rests upon’. The vast divergence in technological devices poses a challenge, 
and to ensure DFs continued effectiveness, reliance is placed upon research into a number 
of problem areas, generated by both professional organisations, industry practitioners, and 
academia, and this was acknowledged in 2010 by Garfinkel. Now, in 2017 this stance 
remains unchanged, and in an environment which remains in a constant state of 
development, practitioners are now more reliant than ever on research carried out by 
themselves and others. Lillis et al., (2016) provide an overview of future areas of research 
for the DF field with numerous other proposals of a DF research agenda having been offered 
in previous years (see Beebe, 2009; Nance et al., 2009; Karie and Venter, 2015; Jerman-
Blažič and Klobučar, 2016). Defining areas of future interest helps to provide direction for DF 
and supports the effective allocation of available  resources. Yet it has been suggested that 
a disconnect exists between industry and researchers (Sremack, 2007), where standards of 
accuracy may diverge and the possibility of misinterpretations of digital data may exist.  
 
Any contribution to DF knowledge from research must be valid. Christensen, et al., (2014) 
state that ‘validity can best be thought of as the overall probability of reaching the correct 
conclusion, given a specific method and data. Methods that are considered “valid” give us 
the correct conclusion more often than chance’. The need for robust research lies with the 
level of reliance placed upon it. Practitioners operating in industry may depend on 
information and guidance published in order to analyse content found during an 
investigation. The need to entrust in the work of others may be due to a number of factors 
including a lack of time or resources available to independently carry out the level of required 
research themselves. To provide context, the depth of experimentation which can take place 
in academic environments, where the dissemination of  research is often a key component of 
that profession (see for example, within the United Kingdom, the Research Excellence 
Framework (http://www.ref.ac.uk/) and its impact on universities) may be greater than time 
allows in industry (Sremack, 2007). The creation, publication and sharing of domain specific 
research is a positive act, helping to combat criticism of the field of DF having frequently 
operated with  a ‘silo mentality’ (Rogers and Seigfried, 2004; Biros et al., 2008; 
Spyridopoulos et al., 2013). Yet, caution should be taken with regards to the validity and 
accuracy of research contributions being placed in circulation, particularly where research 
documenting the interpretive analysis of artefacts is offered with accompanying data parsing 
facilities. Should the accuracy of any interpretation be flawed, its application in the real world 
can lead to severe consequences. Further, should erroneous DF research enter mainstream 
viewing, it can lead to its widespread use, potentially jeopardizing multiple cases. As has 
been highlighted in multiple publications, there is a lack of standardisation in DF (Beebe, 
2009; Karyda and Mitrou, 2007; Bulbul et al., 2013) where testing and research procedures 
vary, and arguably, there is also a lack of consistency and clarity in the procedures and 
methodologies adopted and utilised during DF research.  
 
There is a need for standardisation and transparency in DF research methodologies to allow 
sufficient peer-review of practices, secondary interpretation of data and the ability to assess 
the reliability of results that are offered in any contribution to knowledge. This article offers 
the Framework for Reliable Experimental Design (FRED) in an attempt to formalise a base 
from which to design and carry out robust DF research providing for the accurate 
interpretation of digital data. FRED is not concerned with the high-level investigation 
process, but is targeted for application at the research level and at those carrying out 
analysis of applications and digital artefacts to establish their functionality. Existing DF 
frameworks frequently focus on the targeted analysis of specific data types, artefacts or 
systems (discussed further in Section 3). However, FRED provides low level investigative 
support at the point of the planning and development of robust experimental design and 
implementation, regardless of the data under investigation. Existing DF frameworks often 
overlook the process of planning, constructing and undertaking a valid experiment which 
may jeopardise the reliability of results. The FRED framework can be applied to almost all 
DF investigative research and documents the stages involved in order to design and carry 
out effective testing to achieve valid results, supporting the DF practitioner during their 
investigations and research. It is designed to be a resource for industry and academia to 
help standardise and openly document the stages of any testing and research undertaken, 
to allow effective scrutiny, peer-review and evaluation of any outputs offered. FRED is a six 
step framework, supporting the planning, implementation, and analysis of digital data in 
order to establish a factually accurate outcome 
 
2 The need for admissible evidence 
It is imperative that the results of any DF investigation are reliable, based on procedures and 
interpretation derived from sound research. Where an investigation surrounds illegal acts, in 
England and Wales, the standard of proof to be obtained is ‘beyond reasonable doubt’, with 
a majority of at least 10 (of 12) jury members agreeing on a verdict needed. Under direction 
of the trial judge, DF expert witnesses are under a responsibility to present juries with the 
information needed to make an informed decision. This is often not a straightforward 
process, with Naughton (2007, p18) stating ‘criminal trials are not a consideration of factual 
innocence or factual guilt in any straightforward sense. They are highly technical affairs 
which attempt to determine if defendants are ‘guilty’ or ‘not guilty’ of criminal offences on the 
basis of the reliability of the evidence before the court’. The criminal justice system is not 
perfect and wrongful convictions have been documented, with Naughton and Tan (2010) 
drawing attention to the following comments raised in Director of Public Prosecutions v. 
Shannon [1974] 59 Cr.App.R.250.  
 
‘The law in action is not concerned with absolute truth, but with proof before a 
fallible human tribunal to a requisite standard of probability in accordance with 
formal rules of evidence’.  
 
The presentation of expert evidence is a powerful tool, one which has the ability to sway jury 
decision making (see for example the cases of Sally Clark and Angela Cannings, where 
expert evidence testimony regarding cot death were considered misleading (Naughton and 
Tan, 2010)). In addition, the reliance and trust by jurors in expert evidence can cloud 
judgement and decision making (Lovett and Kovera, 2008). In England and Wales, experts 
are under a duty following The Criminal Procedure Rules 2015 Section 19 to ‘help the court 
to achieve the overriding objective by giving opinion which is objective and unbiased’. 
Evidence is admissible if it is of assistance to the court, the expert has relevant experience 
and is impartial, and, that the evidence is reliable (Crown Prosecution Service, 2014). 
Expanding on the need for reliability, the following guidance is offered. 
 
‘There should be a sufficiently reliable scientific basis for the expert evidence 
or it must be part of a body of knowledge or experience which is sufficiently 
organised or recognised to be accepted as a reliable body of knowledge or 
experience...The reliability of the opinion evidence will also take into account 
the methods used in reaching that opinion, such as validated laboratory 
techniques and technologies, and whether those processes are recognised as 
providing a sufficient scientific basis upon which the expert's conclusions can 
be reached. The expert must provide the court with the necessary scientific 
criteria against which to judge their conclusions’ (Crown Prosecution Service, 
2014). 
 
Courts may take into account a number of factors for determining the reliability of expert 
evidence in England and Wales, with guidance provides in the Criminal Practice Directions 
[2015] EWCA Crim 1567 Section 19A with focus drawn to points a,b,c,d and h. 
  
‘(a) the extent and quality of the data on which the expert’s opinion is  based, 
and the validity of the methods by which they were obtained;  
 
(b) if the expert’s opinion relies on an inference from any findings, whether 
the opinion properly explains how safe or unsafe the inference is  (whether  
by  reference  to  statistical  significance  or  in  other appropriate terms); 
  
(c) if the expert’s opinion relies on the results of the use of any method (for 
instance, a test, measurement or survey), whether the opinion takes  proper 
account of matters, such as the degree of precision or margin of uncertainty, 
affecting the accuracy or reliability of those results;  
 
(d) the extent to which any material upon which the expert’s opinion is based 
has been reviewed by others with relevant expertise (for instance,  in peer‐
reviewed publications), and the views of those others on that material;  
 
(h) whether the expert’s methods followed established practice in the field 
and, if they did not, whether the reason for the divergence has been properly 
explained’. 
 
In direct application to DF, the Criminal Practice Directions raise a number of concerns. A 
lack of defined research methodologies in DF leads to varying standards of practice, making 
an assessment of the validity of any utilised method difficult. A poorly constructed 
methodology prevents the accurate assessment of the precision or margin of uncertainty in 
results obtained, both by a third party, and worryingly, by an investigator. In addition, a 
methodology which is poorly documented cannot be established as best practice within the 
field or effectively peer reviewed, meaning that the validity of its outputs cannot be 
determined. 
 
Ensuring the reliability of presented evidence forms the crux of an expert's role, and the 
need to present a factual account is crucial with Sallavaci and George (2013) stating that 
now, experts are facing increasing requirements to prove the validity of their work. Olivier 
(2016, p.49) states the importance of this, noting ‘science is a quest for truth. The law, when 
considering disputes, often need to determine facts. Facts are claims that are true’. Mistakes 
during the interpretation of digital data during a forensic investigation can have significant 
impacts on all parties involved in the process. Misinterpretation may lead to the prosecution 
of the innocent or exoneration of the guilty. The consequences wrongful conviction for the 
individual are severe, impacting upon all aspects of life. Scott (2010) highlights the 
psychological effects which can be incurred by those wrongly convicted, impacting upon 
health, relationships and the ability to engage in a ‘normal’ lifestyle. In addition, 
compensation for wrongly convicted individuals may be sought (see for example, Gov.uk 
(n.d.) in conjunction with sections 133, 133a and 133b of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 for 
procedural details for claims). Incorrectly interpreted evidence can also impact on the expert 
and their continued credibility for operating in the field, as well as the organisation they 
represent, drawing scrutiny upon areas such as sufficient knowledge, training and suitability 
of practices.    
 
With the importance of establishing reliable DF evidence evident, the lack of documented DF 
research methodologies to support the development of valid research remains a concern. 
This omission may lead to divergences in practices and no consistent approach to 
establishing the reliability of work carried out. The issue of establishing reliability is not just a 
problem at a research-level, but also a legal challenge, with Ireland and Beaumont (2015, 
p.6) suggesting that in the United Kingdom, ‘judges continue to be provided with no real 
guidance on how they should determine evidential reliability’.  
 
There are a series of frameworks which focus on the high-level core elements of an 
investigation, notably acquire, examine, analyse, and report (Baryamureeba and Tushabe, 
2004, Carrier and Spafford, 2004; Reith et al., 2002; von Solms et al., 2006; Kohn et al., 
2006, Selamat et al., 2008). In addition, there are numerous frameworks which focus on 
elements of a DF investigation such as network events, forensic readiness, social networks; 
triage and cloud investigations (Pilli et al., 2010; Elyas, et al., 2014; Jang and Kwak, 2015;  
Martini,and Choo, 2012; Hitchcock, et al., 2016). Yet there is an oversight in the 
development of frameworks for developing robust evidential data derived from planned 
testing processes, the reverse engineering of evidential artifacts and the interpretation of any 
discovered data.  
 
To provide an example, currently frameworks may suggests a need to investigate artefact of 
type ‘A’ during an investigation of a certain type. Such frameworks may go on to highlight the 
particular functions of artefact ‘A’. Yet there are a lack of guidance defining the adequate 
procedures needed to fully test, examine, and interpret the content and function of artefact 
‘A’ to ensure any retrieved results are accurate. In essence, this article argues the need for 
guidance to support practitioners and academics in DF at a ‘research and testing level’ 
construct and implement forensically sound testing methodologies to ensure the potential 
admissibility of their work.  
 
2.1 Governance and validation:- ISO/IEC 17025  
The requirements for valid testing and establishment of robust evidence in forensic sciences 
including DF have been formalised by the International Organisation for Standardization 
(n.d.a) leading to the development of a number of standards designed to improve 
organisational performance, enhance credibility and in some instances, meet legal 
requirements  (International Organisation for Standardization, n.d.b; n.d.c). Whilst many 
have traditionally been pursued by DF organisations (for example, ISO 9001 Quality 
management; ISO/IEC 27001 Information security management), the Forensic Science 
Regulator (2016) has defined a deadline of October 2017 where DF organisations should 
have achieved ISO/IEC 17025 certification. The International Organisation for 
Standardisation (n.d.) defines ISO/IEC 17025 as follows. 
 
‘ISO/IEC 17025:2005 specifies the general requirements for the competence to 
carry out tests and/or calibrations, including sampling. It covers testing and 
calibration performed using standard methods, non-standard methods, and 
laboratory-developed methods.’ (International Organisation for Standardization, 
n.d.) 
 
To provide an example, a non-standard method may simply involve procedures for 
investigating and interpreting data from an unfamiliar or undocumented system, device or file 
system (Bryant, 2016, p.144). Such methods are likely to be unpublished and not subject to 
field-wide review. Conversely, standard methods include those which have been tested, 
validated and documented, typically resulting in acceptance by those in the field, and are 
widely used within the confines of which they were developed for, such as conventional disk 
imaging processes (National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2016). Finally, 
laboratory-developed methods include those procedures constructed internally by staff to 
provide an effective analysis of a device where no existing documented procedures are 
available. The United Kingdom Accreditation Service (2016) suggest a lot of investigatory 
methods fall within the category of ‘laboratory developed’. 
 
A push for ISO/IEC 17025 certification in DF is seen as a method of ensuring standards of 
quality and organisational competence (Barbara, 2012; House of Commons Science and 
Technology Committee, 2016), bringing DF into line with other forensic disciplines 
(Beckett,and Slay, 2007). Such accreditation has also been previously called for by the 
Committee on Identifying the Needs of the Forensic Science Community in 2009 (p.25) who 
stated that ‘laboratory accreditation and individual certification of forensic science 
professionals should be mandatory’. In addition, adherence to such quality standards is 
argued as ensuring the maintenance of “public confidence and to reduce the potential for 
miscarriages of justice” (Home Office, 2016 p.9). Whilst the imposition of this requirement 
upon DF has not been met with universal acceptance (see Professor Peter Sommer et al’s. 
(2017) recent practitioner survey regarding consensus over the proposed mandatory 
adoption of ISO/IEC 17025), with arguments of cost and complexity being mooted, it remains 
an impending prerequisite for DF laboratories. 
 
As stated above, ISO/IEC 17025 concerns establishing requirements for competence, ‘for a 
management system for providers of laboratory-based forensic science services to 
demonstrate their ability to deliver consistently products and services that meet the 
requirements of their customers in the Criminal Justice System (CJS)’ (Forensic Science 
Regulator, 2016. p.12). Testing and calibration form one of ISO/IEC 17025’s core targets in 
order to regulate the development of forensically sound procedures of this type, ensuring 
that any techniques utilised are ‘capable of meeting the requirements of the ‘trier of fact’’ 
(Guo, Slay and Beckett, 2009). Testing and validation forms a major part of a DF 
practitioners role to ensure the validity of results gathered during an investigation and proof 
of such processes must be documented in line with section 5.4 of ISO/IEC 17025. The 
Forensic Science Regulators (2014) Codes of Practice and Conduct for Digital Forensic 
Services draws reference to this need. 
 
‘The provider shall ensure that, for the range of the digital forensics methods it 
uses, the validation requirements take account of staff competency levels, the 
nature and difficulty of the tasks to be carried out, and the level of acceptability of 
the method in the wider forensic science and criminal justice community’. Forensic 
Science Regulators (2014, p5 at 6.1.4)   
 
Methods used for testing and validation must be robust as well as be designed to allow 
effective validation to take place. Procedural developments for testing have been offered by 
the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s (2015) Computer Forensics Tool 
Testing (CFTT), which focuses on a core set of functions including disk imaging, carving and 
string searching. These methods provide a foundation from which to build future testing and 
for validation purposes, yet it must be noted that they are non-exhaustive and do not cover 
all of the available techniques and software utilised by practitioners currently. In addition, 
they target the validation of specific vendor tools. In addition, the Scientific Working Group 
on Digital Evidence (2017a) provide best practice guidance regarding digital data analysis. 
Of particular interest is Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence (2017b) documentation 
regarding error mitigation in DF tools.  
 
Whilst both SWGDE and NIST provide guidance and support to practitioners seeking to 
validate procedures, they remain focused on specific areas of an investigation. In 2009, Slay 
et al., indicated that there was a lack of ‘verifiable, repeatable testing protocols ...and a new 
paradigm should be adopted that treats a tool or process independently of the mechanism 
used to validate it’. Arguably this situation remains, leading to the proposal of FRED offered 
in this article. Flandrin et al., (2014) suggest that existing methodologies for validation and 
testing are often either too complex to be effectively utilised or lack extensive coverage of 
the required aspects of an investigation. FRED is an attempt to simplify the design, 
implementation and testing process, whilst providing a formalised framework from which to 
develop forensically sound testing/validation procedures. 
 
3 The methodology proposal 
Sommer (2010, p12) stated that ‘regulatory trends in forensic science point strongly to the 
need for exhaustive testing of all findings and tools. At the same time a number of 
jurisdictions suggest a judicial test for the admissibility of novel scientific evidence. But in 
fields such computers and cellphones, the rate of change is faster than the normal times 
required for peer-reviewed publication’. As a result, establishing effective strategies for 
discovering the facts associated with a set of digital data is a difficult task. The rate of 
change in technology exacerbates this issue, as the lifespan of some analysis techniques or 
interpretative guidance can be short lived due to the rate of release of updated versions of 
software which may change the internal structure or fundamental workings of an application 
and its associated data (see for example Mozilla (2017) Firefox, with over 150 version 
updates across 15 years). With this in mind, frameworks which are artefact-specific can be 
of limited use. Yet frameworks providing a practitioner with the support to implement robust 
testing on any form of digital data are arguably a valuable tool and remain in short supply.  
 
In the United States, following the case of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 
579 (1993), the ‘Daubert Test’ was established to assess the reliability of expert evidence 
(see Scanlon and Kechadigy (2014) for a detailed breakdown of the test). This four stage 
assessment evaluates the testing carried out on a procedure, it’s known error rates, 
publication and subsequent peer-review of the process and acceptance of the procedure 
within the specific domain’s scientific community. Although organizations such as the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (2015) and programs such as the Computer 
Forensics Tool Testing (CFTT) Project offer some support, largely, the burden of obtaining  
reliable ‘Daubert Standard’ forensic evidence lies with the practitioner themselves.  
 
Where currently frameworks typically fall within one of two categories, either ‘generic 
procedural’ covering the stages of an investigation or ‘artefact-specific’ where a specific 
application is targeted for analysis, the proposed FRED methodology targets the research 
and testing of digital data phase (see Figure 1). Typically at this stage, practitioners are 
trying to establishing a chain of events by attempting to understand the function and 
evidential worth of any given digital data, often attempting to simulate/reconstruct an event. 
Erroneous decision making and testing flaws at this point could undermine any future 




Figure 1: The application of the FRED research framework. FRED is application 
independent, and functions as a support mechanism during research and testing to 
ensure robust findings from which to build case hypotheses.   
 
As part of ISO/IEC 17025, Section 5.4 requires organisations to identify whether methods 
used are acknowledged/accepted by the field (either nationally or internationally) and that 
relevant, up-to-date standards are utilised. Generally, all testing methods must be validated, 
whether standard or non-standard (Forensic Science Regulators, 2016). The problem 
remains that there are limited frameworks which provide support for testing and validation of 
results at the level which FRED is proposed. Whilst SWGDE and NIST both provide targeted 
testing at top level procedures such as disk imaging, FRED is aimed at validating and testing 
the forensic interpretation of relevant artefacts, from which thousands may exist without 
standards for effective parsing and evaluation of information. Currently there are limited 
frameworks defining the stages of this process and the requirements involved. FRED offers 
a standardised procedures for developing and documenting robust testing of this type. 
 
Figure 2 documents the structure of FRED and its six core stages, namely ‘plan’, 
‘implement’, ‘evaluate’, ‘repeat’, ‘analyse’ and ‘confirm’ and each stage is discussed in depth 
in Section 3. 
 
 
Figure 2: The FRED research framework. 
 
3.1 Plan 
The planning stage of any research provides a solid base from which to acquire a reliable 
set of results. Defining a suitable plan may in some instances be straight forward and in 
others be multifaceted, dependant upon the complexity of the digital data structures under 
investigation. As part of the planning phase it should be clear what any research is trying to 
establish, therefore it is necessary to define the goal of the research from the outset. 
 
i. What is the goal? 
What may seem an obvious question can easily be overlooked. Those undertaking DF 
research need to be clear on what is hoped to be achieved by the research/test which is 
planned. Failure to define specific goals may result in nonspecific and inapplicable findings 
from a given test. To provide an example, goal setting can be as simple as establishing 
where Internet history is stored by a particular Internet browsing application or as complex 
as reverse engineering the internal metadata structure of any Internet history data. As part of 
the process of determining a research goal, reconnaissance of any existing documented 
findings (published or vendor specific manuals) should not be discounted as a resource from 
which to acquire initial and ‘potentially’ accurate understanding of an artefact from which to 
derive a research hypothesis. Although where research into unconventional 
applications/artefacts is taking place, such resources are unlikely to exist. 
 
To achieve the research goal, a plan must take into consideration the potential need to 
dynamically adapt to unforeseen issues, events and newly acquired knowledge from 
preliminary findings. A plan must facilitate testing which is comprehensive, with 
consideration given not only to the need to find evidential content of a particular type, but 
also to prove that it also does not exist in a different form elsewhere. To provide an example, 
consider the development of a plan to examine the basic content of the ThumbCache in 
Windows 7 systems. The ThumbCache maintains small thumbnail images of files viewed in 
‘thumbnail view’, collected from across the operating system (for an indepth discussion of 
the ThumbCache see Parsonage (2012) and Quick et al., (2014)). A plan to establish the 
content and structure of the ThumbCache forms the goal of the plan, with a hypothesis of 
‘the ThumbCache contains thumbnail images’ derived from an initial review of published 
documentation.  
 
The ThumbCache can be thought of as a linear structure of images, which when approached 
procedurally, the user may discover that the first thumbnail stored is of type .jpg. It would at 
which point be easy to assume that all stored thumbnails are of type .jpg and assume that 
the goal of testing is achieved. Yet, the Thumbcache also stores thumbnail images in .png 
format (see for example the thumbcache_256.db located at 
C:\Users\<UserName>\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Explore and .bmp for the 
thumbcache_96.db). In this case (and all testing cases), a developed plan, must be capable 
of exhausting all possibilities before assumptions can be made on the attainment of the 
research goal. This need for exhaustive planning is documented in Figure 3. Here, following 
planned ‘Route 1’ would result in an erroneous interpretation of the thumbcache file 
structure. Testing via ‘Route 2’ would provide a comprehensive understanding of the 
artefact.   
 
Figure 3: A testing example.  
 
Consideration should also be given to the experimental conditions and environment used 




ii. Test Conditions and Environment 
Consideration of the testing environment is key to ensuring the validity of outputs. Test 
results must be accurate, repeatable and applicable, where all three variables are subject to 
the platform from which testing is taking place. To provide a basic example, research into the 
functionality of the Microsoft Windows Recycle Bin for a Windows 7 operating system is not 
applicable to legacy systems such as XP. The same can be determined of software 
applications and their artefacts subject to scrutiny from a case under investigation, results 
derived from testing need to be applicable to the exact conditions which were experienced 
by a defendant. Suitable setup of the testing environment is therefore crucial. The following 
options are available to the user. 
 
1. Flat analysis: Flat analysis involves the examination of evidence captured within a 
standard forensic image file format (i.e. .E01, .dd). This can either be from a live 
investigation or after a test environment has been imaged in a forensic image format. 
Although this method captures the state of a system for a given point in time it has 
the following disadvantages: 
a. It is static: This approach prevents dynamic testing from taking place due to 
an image being a snapshot in time. Therefore a real-time examination of 
system-triggered events during testing is not possible. Instead, system events 
must be initiated by test data, then captured immediately after via the imaging 
process.  
b. A partial picture: As an image is a snapshot it may only provide a partial 
description of events triggered from test data (depending on the time that the 
image was captured and the time taken for system events to initiate and 
complete after test data has been used) or from a defendant’s device. To 
enable a greater understanding of events will likely require significant 
repetition of the testing and imaging process. This process can be time 
consuming and resource intensive (Ayers, 2009). 
2. Reverse image: The reverse image and boot is a well established process for 
replicating the exact function of a suspect system. The process involves writing an 
image file back to a separate hard disk drive, providing a bootable version of a 
defendant's device. The benefits of this approach is that testing can take place in an 
environment which is exactly the same as those experienced by a defendant and the 
researcher has access to all of their applications, setup using a defendant's 
configurations, in a usable environment. The environment is dynamic, where a user 
can test multiple functionality in one session. When complete, the device can be 
powered off and accessed using traditional write-protection equipment and 
examined. However the following issues must be considered. 
a. Time and Resources: Setting up the environment takes time to complete. This 
includes the time taken to image the original device then write it to a 
secondary device in order to boot from it. 
b. Validity: Once the device is booted, thousands of system changes are 
occurring every second. Further, after a first set of testing, the environment is 
contaminated with test data. At which point, the environment would either 
need to be wiped and re-reversed imaged again (effectively sanitized of all 
additional interactions) or any testing plan must be dynamically adapted to 
accommodate new unique test data  in order to differentiate actions across all 
separate test which are run (see Section 3.2 for a discussion of unique test 
data and its impact). 
c. No control: Once the system is live, it is subject to change by applications 
installed by a defendant and potentially unknown to the researcher. 
Contamination of results from 3rd party sources on the device, outside the 
confines of the test plan is possible and have to be assessed and any impact 
addressed with 100% reliability. 
3. Utilising virtual machine configurations: Virtual machine (VM) configurations offer a 
flexible environment implementable with limited resources. There are two 
approaches to take, the first through the generation of VM configuration files using an 
application like Virtual Forensic Computing (GetData, 2017) to virtualise a 
defendant's computer platform (similar to the reverse imaging techniques noted 
above). The second option, where replication of a defendant's setup is not necessary 
involves the use of a standard VM configuration (sanitized blank operating system 
installed from an install disk/.iso) where associated virtual hard drive files can be 
extracted and interpreted from within a separate digital forensic package. VMs 
provide an environment which can be sanitized and reconstructed with ease and 
relatively low cost in terms of time and resources.   
 
The choice of platform from which to implement testing depends upon the goal of the 
research. If the focus is to replicate events which have occurred in an investigation currently 
live, (coined in this article as ‘reproductive research’) then a platform/setup capable of the 
recreation of a defendant's exact setup is crucial to ensuring reliable findings which can 
apply to that investigation. However, if the focus it simply to develop an understanding of a 
system artefact/log/process (coined in this article as ‘explorative research’), then a platform 
choice can be made with regard to factors such as compatibility, support (in terms of which 
platform the target application/artefact is likely to be found) and available resources.  
 
In addition, any plan needs to be able capable of recreation (see discussion at Section 3.4) 
and should incorporate a setup and set of procedures which permit this. Recreation is 
needed both in the pursuit of reliable findings and also so that any procedure can be 
followed by a third party if necessary to demonstrate how results were obtained. This is a 
well documented principle in best practice guidelines globally (ACPO, 2012; U.S. 
Department of Justice, 2004).  
 
3.2 Implement 
Following a suitably designed plan, stage two of FRED involves its implementation. 
Implementation requires the user to carry out a series of actions to simulate user behaviour 
in line with the planned methodology. These actions constitute the ‘data set’ which is used 
during testing. 
 
i. Data set: Data set usage is a key factor for consideration and arguably, this element 
should also be considered during methodology planning. Determining the test data set to be 
used during any research (to simulate standard user behaviour, which can then be 
evaluated) involves establishing a suitable set of test content which can be used to derive 
reliable results from the planned tests, ensuring that all outcomes have been exhausted. 
Test data can include a set of actions (such as saving or editing a file, or utilising an 
application's function) or a set of inputs (such as searching for specific terms or creating 
specific content). Effective test content needs to be diverse enough to implement testing in 
sufficient depth to exhaust all potential outcomes and to ensure the functionality of a given 
application or artefact can be fully understood. Also, at later stages of FRED, a sufficiently 
disparate and extensive data set allows for the repetition of testing to establish consistent 
behaviours during the latter stages of FRED.  
 
Contamination is also an element which must be considered, meaning that test data must be 
unique enough to be identifiable as the actions of the tester, with no possibility of data being 
derived from alternative sources. The use of a sanitized test environment will support this 
process (discussed in section 3.1), limiting the potential for contamination. To provide an 
illustration of the need for the use of an appropriate test dataset to simulate user actions, 
take for example the testing of an Internet browser application such as Internet Explorer (IE). 
On installation, IE by default maintains default favorites, bookmarks and a preconfigured 
homepage (www.msn.com on a default Windows 7 installation). Any test data used must be 
distinguishable from data derived from sources beyond the confines of the test (such as any 
pre-established website data create on installation of the application). Therefore in this case, 
any websites used to test IE’s functionality must not already be contained as part of any 
default data acquired as part of it’s installation. Consideration must also be given to the 
presence of any website data from other sources within a test system setup (other browser 
applications which may be installed or browsing data from past sessions which may be 
embedded within system artefacts or the unallocated regions of the system and potentially 
contaminate any findings). To verify that test data is viable for use in this scenario, it is best 
practice to first establish that any chosen test data does not exist on the system prior to 
testing, through preliminary keyword searching and analysis. Issues of contamination can 
also be limited by pre-test environment verification processes (testing to establish that 
chosen test data does not already exist) and the use of clean test environments.  
 
3.3 Evaluate 
Following a successful test implementation, the outcome must be evaluated. In order to do 
this, the effect of the implemented tests on a system or series of artefacts must be identified 
and collected.  
 
i. Identifying and capturing changes brought about by testing: Once a test phase has been 
implemented, changes to digital data must be identified. These changes represent how a 
particular artefact/application behaves following system usage, and the data which is being 
stored documenting these actions. The process of identifying changes is not straightforward, 
due to the number of modifications occurring on an operating systems (OS) every second 
and both changes to application specific files and generic operating system structures and 




Figure 4: A representation of changes occurring following application testing. 
 
When dealing with an isolated system artefact (for example, examining the Thumbcache as 
discussed in section 3.1), identifying where changes occur following testing may not prove 
an issue as data may be confined solely to within that artefact. However, when trying to 
identify changes brought about by testing of an application which is potentially triggering 
system wide events,  the task poses a greater challenge. Keyword searching techniques can 
help to support the identification of changes or storage of test criteria used, linking back to 
the implementation stage of FRED and the need to use unique test data as discussed 
previously. In addition, the analysis of time stamps can help to highlight potential areas of 
evidential interest and reduce the amount of redundant files subject to an investigation. After 
a test process, if a file's modified timestamp remains unchanged, this is an indication that it 
has remained unaffected by any testing which has taken place (subject to any malicious 
tampering of file system metadata). Figure 5 provides an example of how focusing on time 
stamp information can help to separate redundant files from those likely to contain evidential 
content relating to a process under investigation.  
 
 
Figure 5: A demonstration of using time stamps to establish files subject to change, 
corresponding to a process under investigation. Here, Chrome is installed and used 
to browse a test website, with potentially evidential files being filtered based on 
timestamp information.  
 
Finally, observing the live process related information associated to an application under 
investigation can help to identify relevant files. Where the test environment for an application 
is a Microsoft operating system,  Windows Sysinternals’s Process Monitor application can 
provide some support. Process Monitor allows a user to examine ‘real-time file system, 
Registry and process/thread activity’ (Sysinternals, 2017), allowing system events to be 
captured as testing is being carried out. A user can filter events based on a Process 
Identifier (PID) associated with an application under investigation, allowing system changes 
associated to to a chosen application to be filtered. Both registry and file system changes 
associated to a PID can be captured, including where information is being written to disk, 
suggesting potentially evidential locations. Process Monitor can be installed on a test 
environment and run as a background process during testing, recording system activity live, 
which can be collected and examined retrospectively (see Figure 6).  
 
 
Figure 6: A example of Process Monitor output. 
 
ii. Is the output within the boundaries of your original hypothesis?: It is also important at the 
evaluation stage to consider whether the result of an implemented test is within the 
boundaries of what was expected from testing. For example, existing research may have 
informed the design of the planned test, but the changes which subsequently occurring 
within a system may be different to those previously documented or what was initially 
expected. In addition, it may not have been possible to identify system changes after an 
implemented test. If either situation presents, the following options are available. 
 
1. Redesign of the test: The researcher should consider if the research has been 
sufficiently planned. If weaknesses in methodology are present at this stage, it is 
necessary to return to the planning stage of FRED and re-design the plan based on 
the acquired experience of this round of testing. 
2. Re-run the test: The more times a test is repeated, the greater the chance of 
establishing consistency in behaviour. Although changes may not be within the 
confines of initial expectations, it does not mean that the results are incorrect. 
Establishing consistent behaviour means establishing factual behaviour.  
3. Test data set issues: Consideration must also be given to the test data used during 
the implementation phase. If test data is of the wrong type or lack the diversity 
needed to simulate real-world usage of the application, it may be failing to trigger 
relevant events on a system.  
4. If changes cannot be detected: If it is not possible to detect changes within a target 
artefact of OS, this could be due to the following reasons: 
a. Changed data may be compressed or encrypted. As a result keyword 
searching may return limited hits (subject to prior decompression / decryption 
processes being run). However, in such instances, timestamp information 
should still reveal that changes have occurred. If it is suspected that content 
may be encrypted, then a greater challenge presents itself. First a practitioner 
needs to be able to actually identify that content is in fact encrypted and not 
simply obfuscated or stored in a way which is interpretable by an application 
under investigation, but not readable without some form of data conversion. If 
encryption is in use (for example, where the timestamps of a file suggest 
internal modifications are occurring following test actions), then decryption 
may be an option during testing. Successfully decrypting a target file may 
provide access to modified content as a result of testing and help to 
understand what is occurring following test actions. However, in order to 
decrypt the content, a practitioner needs to identify the encryption algorithm in 
use and passphrase or protocol to trigger decryption. Depending on the 
method and strength of any encryption method, the feasibility of this process 
may vary. Yet the success of any decryption process may mean the 
difference between understanding the process under investigation by 
acquiring access to all data, or missing crucial data linked to an application's 
usage.   
b. Test data may not be comprehensive / of the wrong type, in order to trigger 
sufficient events by an application under investigation. 
c. Misunderstanding of the artefact / application under investigation meaning 
that it functions fundamentally different to what was originally planned for, 
requiring re-planning of testing methods. 
d. Evidential changes may occur external to any local storage. Consider that 
information may be stored in cloud / server side of even in physical memory 
(particularly relevant for privacy-enhancing applications).  
e. User error. Is the researcher doing something fundamentally wrong and as a 
result, is failing to detect changes which are there to be found. 
 
If changes can be detected and collected, it is crucial to establish whether these events can 
be consistently reproduced.   
 
3.4 Repeat  
Repeatability is the key to establishing robust knowledge as the standard to be achieved 
through the utilisation of FRED is that of fact, where repeatability is a useful measurement of 
reliability. Reliability cannot be established from one test alone, and result must be capable 
of being replicated. However, it must be noted that it is the testing process that must be 
capable of repetition. Repeating a process should result in consistent outputs; however, 
even when the same actions are carried out, testing can also reveal an application’s 
behavioural inconsistencies. Establishing consistency requires running the same test 
procedures with the same data on multiple occasions. Then taking knowledge this acquired 
knowledge and running the test with variants of this test data to confirm actions. If a test 
cannot be repeated, a researcher may need to revisit the planning stage of FRED to revise 
the test plan.  
 
The goal of any testing is to develop a repeatable structure which offers consistency in 
application and soundness of decision making. A suitably devised plan must consider 
repeatability in order to differentiate between results which are reliable and those which have 
been generated by anomalies, one time events or mere coincidence. Yet the issue of 
repeatability also raises the question, ‘how many times does a test have to be repeated 
before the results are reliable?’. There is no universal answer, and decision making 
regarding the number of repetitions of a test is one which is driven by available resources in 
terms of time equipment, whilst considering the practical feasibility of the research. It is not 
feasible to perform an infinite number of tests, therefore the threshold of repeatability of any 
testing must be decided by the researcher and will be influenced by multiple factors including 
the type of process subject to investigation and the diversity of test data being utilised. In any 
circumstance, to establish reliability in results, a testing procedures must have been 
repeated beyond a negligible number of times, noting the requirement of some legal 
evidential admissibility tests such as the previously discussed Daubert standard which 
require known error rates.  
 
Repeatability and consistency of results is also a requirement for those who seek to develop 
an accurate parsing algorithm in order to automate any devised evidence recovery and 
interpretation procedures. Here consistency (and deviations) in metadata structures must be 
correctly identified to ensure automated processes are not overlooking potentially relevant 
content. The development and use of pseudo-code (a simplified description of a program 
and its structure) to test any identified metadata, file offsets and internal structures will 
support this process.  
 
If consistency in output can be established through repetition of testing, the results can then 
be analysed.  
  
3.5 Analyse   
The analysis stage involves the interpretation of results generated from testing carried out 
and collected during the ‘evaluate’ and ‘repeat’ stages of FRED. At this point, a researcher 
should have at least two sets (likely more) of results generated from the same test or 
associated test processes. The focus of the analysis stage is to be able to explain definitively 
how an artefact/application functions and what are the results of certain user actions. This 
task is not straightforward as Chessman (2017) indicates that establishing the true extent of 
functionality requires a thorough examination of an application’s source code, which in most 
instances is either not possible or not practical. Instead, most DF research is undertaken 
using functional testing (also referred to as behavioural or black-box testing) (Khan and 
Khan, 2012), where test actions are carefully selected to examine expected outputs. 
 
It is important to be able to associate actions with their associated effects on a given system 
(See Figure 7). A researcher should be able to establish that following test action ‘A’ (for 
example, when investigating an Internet browser, the act of saving a bookmark), this action 
results in a series of system changes (‘1’, ‘2’ and ‘5’, which may be system or application 
specific artefacts).  
 
Figure 7: A demonstration of tying test actions to system changes.  
 
Establishing system changes related to test actions is a two way process. Once an action 
can be associated to a change, the process can be reversed. This is particularly important in 
investigation scenarios where only post-mortem events are present on a defendant's 
system. Therefore using Figure 7 again as an example, when an investigator identifies 
system changes ‘1’, ‘2’ and ‘5’ as evidential, these traits can be correlated to an action ‘A’. 
 
The goal of the analysis phase is to determine reliably whether as the result of testing, the 
findings allow a researcher to confirm the facts associated with testing. If a factual outcome 
cannot be established, then two options present themselves, a revision of the test plan and 
its structure or carry out further testing (with a review of test data used) to identify why there 
is a lack of consistency in results.  
     
3.6 Confirm        
The final stage of FRED is the ability to affirm as a matter of fact, the outcome and 
interpretation of testing which has taken place and to document the process. A researcher 
should at this stage be able to factually establish that when investigating an 
application/artefact, say ‘X’, using FRED, user actions ‘Y’ result in outcome ‘Z’. At which 
point, testing procedures can be documented and methodologies formalised for peer review, 
demonstrating rigorous underpinning testing. Consideration must also be given to the fact 
that the results generated from testing must be defensible, therefore a core requirement on 
confirmation is to fully document all procedures in line with the stages of FRED.  
 
Transparency in the testing carried out allows for the reliability of any research to be 
objectively assessed and any potential weaknesses in the validity of results to be highlighted 
before they are wrongfully incorporated into any investigation. Sallavaci and George (2013) 
state that new regulatory requirements for experts, particularly in England and Wales are 
likely to put a DF expert witness in a ‘defensive mode’, trying to justify every evaluative step, 
when writing their reports’. Utilising FRED supports a practitioner to demonstrate the use of 
thorough planning, rigorous testing and valid interpretations, which can be relied upon in a 
court of law.   
 
4 Conclusion 
With the speed of technological developments, DF practitioners will frequently encounter 
applications and artefacts during an investigation maintaining functionality which is not fully 
understood. In these situations, reliance is placed either on existing or the development of 
valid research into these areas. The reliance on DF research by practitioners is substantial, 
where often it underpins the findings of an investigation. The consequences of non-valid 
research findings can be severe for all involved, specifically in a criminal process. This article 
has offered FRED to support those engaged in DF research at all levels including industry 
and academia to support the development of best practice in this area. Such methods for 
supporting validation and testing are increasingly important given current requirements for 
compliance with ISO/IEC 17025. FRED provides a framework from which to design, develop 
and implement DF testing and validation, supporting the generation of reliable, repeatable 
and documentable outputs. FRED also encourages transparency in the research and testing 
process to allow for effective peer-review and for a thorough assessment of the reliability of 
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